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Abstract  
 
With the changing demographics of 
globalization, the emergence and 
prevalence of web application have 
acquired a central and pivotal role in the 
domains of technology and 
advancements. It thus becomes 
imperative to probe deeply into the 
architecture, significance and different 
facets of usages. Web applications 
enclose the functioning between a user 
and the services provided by the server, 
which contains a database as its 
backend. The user can access the 
required information through sending a 
request in the form of text to the web 
server, which is interpreted by the server 
side script to construct an SQL. The 
query is sent to the database which 
responds in order to generate an HTML 
page that is sent back to the user. Since 
the functioning of web application is a 
dynamic and complicated matter, certain 
threats to the database security have 
been registered. One such alarming 
threat is the prevalence of SQL Injection 
Attack. Hence a dynamic algorithm is 
given in this paper for preventing SQL 
Injection Attacks which is based on 
context free grammars and compiler 
parsing techniques. The paper attempts 
to present the notation of a  
 
SQLI Prevent Parser for the prevention 
of SQL Injection Attacks. This Parser 
determines the structure of queries and 
compares whether the queries are 
functionally equivalent or not. This 
parser has been used on a sample web 
application and the results have come 
out to be positive majors to prevent SQL 
Injection Attacks. 
 
I Introduction 
 
There has been a rapid advancement in 
information technology as a result of the 
widespread use of the internet since the 
past few years. The common man today 
uses the internet with a number of 
purposes such as to be used in the field 
of education, for money transactions 
and other countless activities. Though 
there is also an inherent risk in the 
frequent use of the internet as found in 
transferring some money from one bank 
account to another or in the confidential 
database of the companies. The secure 
websites stores the highly sensitive 
information along with non-critical data 
in their database systems in such a way 
that the Owner of the information is able 
to access it quickly while attackers of the 
unauthorized users are blocked in their 
attempts to have access to the 
information.  
 
Hence we have to understand the 
architecture of web application; a web 
application accepts requests from users 
in order to gather information from a 
database. It is assumed by database  
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that the input is correct and thus uses it 
to access the database by creating an 
SQL. These web applications become 
virtually prone to SQL injection attacks 
since these do not check the validity of 
the user queries before submitting them 
to gather the data. For example, 
attackers pretending as genuine user 
utilize maliciously created input text 
which contains SQL instructions in order 
to produce SQL queries on the web 
application back-end. In case web 
application processes the query, the 
accepted malicious query may breach 
security net of the underscored 
database. As a consequence of the 
query there occurs an improper 
functioning of the database parser which 
results in the release of the sensitive 
information [1]. 
In order to have access to the sensitive 
information from the database a general 
break-in strategy is to first create a 
query which will corrupt the functioning 
of the database parser, and forward the 
application of this query to the targeted 
database. This type of approach in order 
to have access to the private information 
is known as SQL injection. Now SQL 
injection has become a common 
occurrence due to the easy access of 
the database via the internet. It is 
equally necessary to have a deep 
understanding of the types of 
communication which occurs during a 
particular session in between a web  
 
 
application and a user in order to have a 
better understanding of SQL injection. 
 
II Overview of SQL injection 
 
A web application is one through which 
a user can access the services provided 
by the web server while working on a 
client machine, which contains a 
database for example an online email id. 
The user enters a login name and 
password to access the email account. 
As he presses the submit button a URL 
is created and is sent to the web server. 
The server side of the script interprets 
the user input due to which a dynamic 
SQL query is created. It is submitted to 
the database and HTML pages are 
generated in response to the query 
which is sent back to the user. A 
particular section of the database query 
code is submitted by the malicious 
attackers to the server, while responding 
with the corresponding result some 
sensitive information is disclosed by the 
server. This is categorized as SQL 
injection attack. A SQL injection attack 
contains injection of a SQL query to the 
application through the input data from 
the client. If successful SQL injection 
can read and modify the data in the 
database (Insert/Update/Delete), it 
means that an SQL injection attack 
takes place. When the intended effect of 
an SQL query is modified by an attacker 
on inserting new SQL keywords of 
operators into the query, following are 
the qualities of SQL injection attacks: 
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i) Threat Modelling   ii) Attack Intent   iii) 
Assets 
 
III. Working of SQL Injection 
 
The concept driving a SQL injection is 
simple above all attacks like these can 
be executed and mastered with ease. 
To exploit the SQL injection weakness 
the basic requirement for the attacker is 
to identify the working of the web 
application. A malicious SQL command 
can be inserted carefully into the content 
of the criteria empowering the attacker 
to trick the web application so that a 
malicious query can be forwarded to the 
database. 
e.g. the LOGIN FORM which accepts 
the username and password from the 
login. The input in the field (“name” and 
“Password”) is directly used to create 
the SQL Query like: 
SELECT * FROM login WHERE name 
= ‘name’ AND password = ‘password’; 
Now, let the user input the correct name 
=“Administrator” and Password=“admin”. 
The query will become: 
SELECT * FROM login WHERE name 
= ‘Adminstrator’ AND password = 
‘admin’; 
 
This will function without any problem. In 
case the user supplied some vulnerable 
string of code then that will empower the 
attacker to by-pass the authentication 
and create an SQL Injection so that he 
finds out the relevant information from  
 
the database. i.e., if user inputs 
username= ’OR 1=1- -then the query will 
be forwarded as : 
 
SELECT * FROM login WHERE name 
= ‘ ’OR 1=1–’AND password = ‘ ’; 
 
It will work as specified below: 
The input data is being used in the 
WHERE clause. Since the application is 
not actually concerned about the query 
simply tailoring a string, user has 
converted a single-component WHERE 
clause into a two-component clause, 
and this makes it certain that the 1 = 1 
clause will be true notwithstanding the 
fact that what the first clause is. The 
query emphasize that "Select everything 
from the table login if the name equals 
"nothing" Or 1=1, ignores anything after 
the comment.  
’  : Is used to close the user input field. 
OR : The SQL query will be continued to 
get the process as equal to what 
proceeds before OR what follows. 
1=1 :  A statement which is all time true. 
– : Discards the rest of the lines in order 
to stop further processing. 
Noticing that 1 will always equal 1, the 
server has been virtually duped as the 
statement received is true and this 
empowers the attacker to have 
additional access. The code which 
relates to the password input field is not 
run by the server and therefore does not 
use it [2]. 
 
 IV. Types of SQL Injection Attacks 
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Divergent types of advanced and 
powerful techniques have been 
developed by attackers over the past 
several years which empower attackers  
to exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities. 
These techniques are much advanced 
than the generic SQL injection attacks 
examples and derive the benefits from 
sophisticated SQL designs. These 
threats must be taken into account while 
working on the development of SQL 
injection attack problems. 
An SQL Injection Attacks proneness can 
be exploited by the attacker once he has 
detected the input source, for this 
purpose the attacker can utilize various 
types of techniques. As per the type and 
extent of the proneness the attack can 
lead to crashing the database, collecting 
the relevant information regarding the 
tables in the database. Given below is a 
synopsis of the main techniques of 
performing SQL injection attacks. 
An isolated attack is not a general 
phenomenon instead a combination of 
attacks either simultaneously or 
sequentially used as per the desired 
target of the attacker. 
 
First Order Attacks 
 
In some attacks the desired result is 
immediately received by the attacker. 
This may be due to the direct response 
by the application with which they are 
interacting or may be via some other  
 
 
response mechanism for example E-
mail. 
 
All type of attacks which is mentioned 
below, if performed directly in text field 
and provides important information or 
data, from the response then such type  
of attack is called First Order Attack or 
Direct injection. 
 
In the case of direct injection the SQL 
query will use each argument submitted 
as such without any modification. For 
example attempt to take parameter’s 
legitimate value and appending a space 
along with the word “OR” with it. In case 
if an error is generated by this, a direct 
injection is possible. 
 
First order is basically performed by 
SELECT query which is used in 
application for retrieving information. 
 
Tautologies Queries 
 
Attack Intent: Bypassing authentication, 
retrieving data, identifying inject able 
parameters. 
Description: The normal aim of this 
type of attack is to inject code that may 
be in one or more conditional 
statements due to which the statements 
are always evaluated as to be true. The 
results of this type of attack take place 
due to the way in which the application 
uses the outcome of the query. The 
most common purpose is to skip 
authentication route and extract data. An 
attacker exploits an injectable area  
IJASCSE Vol 1 Issue 1 2012 
 
 
Jun. 30 
 
 
 
under this type of injection which is 
utilized in a query’s WHERE conditional. 
The transformation of the conditional 
into a tautology results in returning all 
the rows in the database table being 
targeted by the query. For the attack to 
be fruitful the code must either display 
all of the returned records or must 
perform some action so that at least one 
record is returned. 
 
Ex: Let there be an input form with the 
fields “name” and “password”. Using this 
user can login in web application. The 
given below PHP code for the 
application server, created by a web 
application developer has inherent 
weakness for SQL injection attack: 
1. $connection=mysql_connect(); 
2. mysql_select_ db(“sample”); 
3. $user=$HTT_GET_VARS[‘name’]; 
4. 
$pass=$HTTP_GET_VARS[‘password’]; 
5. $query="select * from login_table_ll 
where name=‘$ u_user1_name ’and 
password =‘$p_pass1_name’"; 
6. $result=mysql_query($query); 
7.if (mysql_num_rows($result)==1) echo 
“Authorized” else echo “authorization 
failed”; 
User data created in the form of a web 
are assigned to variables 
“u_user1’_name’ and “p_pass1_name” 
and then utilized to produce the SQL 
statement. 
 
 
Query (i) given below is generated after 
entering valid name 
‘adminstrator1_ad’and valid password 
‘admin1_ad’by genuine user. 
Query = "select * from 
login_table_llwhere 
name=‘adminstrator1_ad’and 
password=‘admin1_ad’";————–(i) 
 
If an attacker writes: ’or 1=1–’in the 
name field (the input entered for the 
other fields are impertinent) leaving the 
password field empty, the structure of 
the SQL query will be changed. 
Query (ii) given below is generated with 
SQL injection by the attacker. 
Query = “select * fromlogin_table_ll 
where name=‘’or 1=1 –’and 
password=‘’——————(ii) 
The complete WHERE clause is 
transformed into a tautology by the code 
injected in the conditional(’OR 1=1–). 
The conditional is used by the database 
as the basis in order to evaluate each 
row and to decide which is to be 
returned to the application. As the 
conditional being a tautology, the query 
evaluation is true for each row in the 
table and so all of them are returned [3]. 
 
Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries 
 
Attack Intent: Retrieving data, 
identifying inject able parameters, 
performing database finger-printing. 
Description: This category of attack 
allows to collect the relevant information 
as per the type and structure of the 
back-end database of a Web application. 
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The main aim of this attack is to gather 
information for further 
attacks and is treated as a preliminary 
step. These attacks pinpoint a weakness 
due to which the application servers 
returns the default error page which 
often contains over description. The 
vulnerable or inject able parameters can 
be revealed to the attacker due to the 
simple fact that error messages are 
being generated. 
The additional error information which 
was fundamentally aimed at assisting 
the programmer to repair or correct their 
application further empowers the 
attacker to access information related to 
the schema of the back-end database. 
During working on this type of attack, he 
tries to inject statements which can 
result in syntax error, type conversion or 
could create logical error into the 
database. The injectable parameters 
can be detected by using the syntax 
errors. The deduction of the data types 
of certain columns or the seperation of 
the data can be done by using the type 
errors. The names of the tables and 
columns causing the errors can often be 
revealed by logical errors. 
Example: In case the syntax error 
consists of a parentheses in the cited 
string (for example SQL Server 
message used in the illustration given 
below) or a message is generated which 
clearly mentions about missing 
parentheses. 
A parentheses must be added to the 
bad value part of the injection, and one 
to the WHERE clause. In few cases two 
or more parentheses may be required. 
Here’s the code: 
mySQL= " SELECT Last_ name1_l, 
First_name1_f, Title_ t1_t, Notes_n1_n 
FROMEmployee_ Table1_eWHERE 
City_ name1_c = (‘ “& strCity &” ’) " 
When an attacker inserts " ’ " then the 
query is built as: 
"SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f, 
Title_t1_t, Notes_n1_n FROM 
Employee_Table1_eWHERE 
City_name1_c =(‘ ’ ’)" 
Then the error generated is : 
Error Type: 
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC 
Driver [Microsoft][SQL Server ]Unclosed 
Parentheses mark before the Character 
String " ’ " From the error generated, the 
attacker knows that here parentheses is 
used. 
Hence, attacker tries to inject the value ’) 
(‘UNION SELECT another field FROM 
another table), thus this query will be 
forwarded to the server. 
SELECT Last_name1_l, First_name1_f, 
Title_t1_t, Note_n1_n FROM 
Employee_table1_e WHERE 
City_name1_c = (‘ ’) (‘UNION SELECT 
another field from another Table ’) ; 
Through the errors generated, the 
attacker gets to know a lot of useful data 
through various steps. 
Hence by the use of error messages 
attacker gets information [4]. 
 
Union Queries 
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Attack Intent: Bypassing Authentication, 
extracting data. 
Description: In such attacks the weaker 
parameters are exploited by the attacker 
with a view to transform the data set 
returned for a specific query. 
This technique allows the attacker to 
form the application, giving back data 
from a table not from the one which 
intended by the developer but from 
another unintended table. 
 
The attacker performs it by introducing a 
statement in the way:’ UNION SELECT 
< remaining of injected query >. 
Since the second/injected query is 
totally controlled by the attackers, this 
query can used by them in order to 
retrieve information from a particular 
table. This attack results in the form of a 
dataset from the database which is the 
collective result of the original query and 
the injected query. 
Example: Referring to the running 
example, an attacker could introduce the 
text " ’UNION SELECT card_no1_c from 
Debit_Card1_d where 
accountNo1_a=100–" into the 
login1_area field, leading to the 
generation of the following query: 
 
SELECT bank_accounts FROM 
users1 WHERE login1_area = ‘’UNION 
SELECT card_no1_c from  
 
Debit_Card1_d where accountNo1_a 
= 100 – AND pass=‘’; 
 
Predicting that there is no login1_area 
equal to “ ”, a null set is returned by the 
first original query, while the data from 
the “Debit_Card1_d” table is returned 
from the second query. For account 
“100” the column “cardNo1_c” would be 
returned by the database in this case. 
The result obtained from these queries 
combines and returns them to the 
application [3]. 
 
Second Order Attacks 
 
In this type of attack when the malicious 
code is injected into the web based 
application instead of being immediately 
executed it is stored by the web 
application i.e. it is first stored in the 
database to be retrieved, rendered or 
executed by the victim. This category of 
attack happens because of the notion 
that when the data is contained in the 
database, it is often supposed to be 
clean and need not be checked again. 
While due to the frequent use of the 
data in the queries, it is still able harm 
the web application. This type of attack 
happens in case where the filtration 
process is skipped during the process of 
data insertion in search page. We 
should apply filtration for special 
characters before storing data in 
databases, which no special characters 
are allowed for inserting in databases. It 
is inherently performed by INSERT 
basics which are used in application. 
INSERT keyword is used to add 
information in the database. In case of 
web application this keyword is used for  
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user registrations, bulletin boards 
inclusion, adding items to shopping carts, 
etc. While trying to INSERT injection it 
could result in the flooding of the rows in 
the database having single quotes and 
SQL keywords. As per the at 
tentativeness of the administrator it can 
be evaluated that what is to be done 
with the information. For example the 
user is on a site on which user 
registration of some kind is allowed. 
A format is provided in which the user 
has to enter name, address, phone 
number, etc. As the information is 
submitted in the format a page is 
generated where this information is 
displayed along with an option to edit 
the information. This is what is required 
by the user. Thus after the process of 
insertion the required data can be 
modified and updated. Thus in case 
some malicious data is inserted in the 
database by the attacker, the data can 
be updated as per the desire of the 
attacker. 
 
Piggybacked Query attack is example of 
Second Order Attack [5]. 
 
Piggybacked Queries 
  
Attack Intent: Inserting or updating data, 
performing denial of service. 
Description: In this category of attack, 
attacker tries to inject queries in the 
original query. These kinds of attacks in  
 
contrast to the other type of attacks 
instead of modifying the original 
intended query tries to insert new and 
distinct query that “piggy-back” on the 
original query. This results in multiple 
SQL queries to the database. The 
initiating query (intended query) is 
executed as normal while the remaining 
queries are injected queries, and being 
executed along with the initiating query. 
The attack of this category is highly fatal. 
In case an attacker succeeds in this 
attack he can virtually insert any sort of 
SQL command in the additional queries 
and is able to execute them along with 
the initiating query. This kind of attack 
vulnerability is often due to the 
possession of a database configuration 
via which multiple statements can be 
inserted in a single string. 
 
Example: If the attacker inputs “ ’; drop 
table login ;” into the password field, the 
application generates the query: 
SELECT * FROM login WHERE 
name=‘admin’ AND password= ‘ ’; 
drop table login ; 
As the first query having query delimiter 
(“;”) is completed the second query is 
executed by the database. The effect of 
the execution of the second query would 
be to drop table login which may lead to 
the destruction of the valuable data [6]. 
 
V. Prevention Methodology 
 
The methodology which has been used 
to prevent the SQL injection attacks is 
the merging of SQLIPreventParser with 
the application therefore protecting  
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against any attacks. Firstly SQLI 
Prevent Parser has been built which is 
used to determines the structure of the 
query. Then limitations of the method 
are identified. Finally, the solution to 
overcome the problems has been 
proposed making the system fully 
efficient. 
 
Approach 
 
The developer built a data structure for 
the parsed representation of the 
statement, which is called a parser. For 
parsing, we require the grammar 
language of statement. In this method, 
by parsing two statements and 
comparing their parser  functionality, it 
leads to conclusion that the two queries 
are equal. When sql is injected 
successfully in database query, the 
parser of the intended SQL query and 
the resulting SQL query is generated 
after mismatch of attacker’s input. 
  
The SQL Query is: 
SELECT * FROM login WHERE login 
name=‘ ’ AND  password=‘ ’; 
Web applications have SQL injection 
vulnerabilities because inputs are not 
sanitized which they use to construct 
structured output. 
 
If an attacker passes name = ’ OR 1=1– 
as the login name, all login name in the 
database will be returned and displayed, 
reason being transformation of entire 
WHERE clause into a tautology of code 
injected in the conditional statement(’  
 
OR 1=1 –). The conditional used by 
database to evaluate each row and 
decide the rows to return to the 
application. Since conditional is a 
tautology, query evaluates each row in 
the table as true and returns all of them 
to application. The problem is reckoned 
by taking into consideration its cause: 
 
The detailed information of the program 
is that the substrings are taken from 
user input and the substrings are 
restrained syntactically. The concept is 
to restrict queries in which the input 
substring modifies the syntactic 
structure of the remaining query. Such 
queries are called SQL injection attacks 
in the perspective of database back-
ends. 
 
The user’s intake is visualized by using 
meta-character displayed as ‘(|’ and ‘|)’. 
It allegorizes the commencement and 
ending of each input string. This meta 
character follow the string through 
assignments, concatenations, etc., thus 
as a query is ready to be transferred to 
database, it contains matching pair of 
markers identifying the substrings from 
input. We should refuse to introduce 
input substrings from modification of the 
syntactic structure of the remaining of 
the query. For this grammar for queries 
as per the standard grammar for SQL 
queries is build up. In the grammar, the 
only productions in which ‘(|’ and ‘|)’ 
occur have the following form: 
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Non terminal ::= ‘(|’ symbol ‘|)’ 
 
Where symbol is either a terminal or  
non-terminal  
 
For query to be in the language of this 
grammar, the substrings surrounded by 
‘(|’ and ‘|)’ must be syntactic. A parser 
generator is used to build a parser for 
grammar and each query is attempted to 
be parsed. In case the query is parsed 
successfully, it meets the syntactic 
constraints and is legitimate. Conversely, 
it fails the syntactic constraints and may 
be a SQL injection attack. 
 
After SQL Prevent Parser is built using 
the grammar of the output language and 
plan of action is specified that permitted 
syntactic forms, it remains on the web 
server and intercepts generated queries. 
Each input needs to be propagated in 
form of some query, notwithstanding the 
input’s source, gets amplified with the 
meta-characters ‘(|’ and ’|)’ Then query 
is generated by the application, which 
SQLIPreventParser attempts to parse. If 
a query parses successfully, SQLI 
Prevent Parser sends it to the database 
without the meta-character. Otherwise, 
the query is block out. 
 
 VI. Limitation 
 
This solution can be overcome in either 
of two ways: 
 
 
1. If the attacker is somehow able to 
detect the delimiter used, it would  
 
require only a slight modification of 
the query to break this protection. 
2. The attacker may simply use a 
brute force attack to simply try out 
all possible combinations (to 
guess the correct delimiter 
combination). 
 
VII. Solution 
 
Original solution where we use static 
delimiter upgraded to circumvent 
potential security leaks. Hence 
implementation by dynamically changing 
the delimiter combination for every 
variable field and not using the same 
delimiter blend for two consecutive 
variable fields or in same field in 
application. As a result of this 
modification to the original algorithm, the 
attacker will have to correctly guess the 
exact sequence of delimiters used to 
bypass the parser’s security system. 
Since the delimiter blend will be cycled 
randomly this will not be easily possible. 
By this proposed method static delimiter 
has been made dynamic. This solution 
makes the parser more secure than 
before. 
Figure 3.3 shows the basic structure of 
work where the user input is interpreted 
by the web application. In the web 
application it has been used the concept 
of dynamic delimiter so that the attacker 
is unable to guess the sequence of the  
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delimiter; here even the user has no 
idea about the sequence of the delimiter.  
 
Hence in the given application the 
limitation of the static delimiter has been 
eliminated. 
 
Figure 3.3: Work Architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
If the user puts any input by using the 
delimiter for example x|)’ OR ’(| 1 = 1 , 
then it will be checked at the application 
itself and the error is reported here itself. 
Now from application query is sent to 
the parser. 
 
 
The Parser determines the structure of 
SQL query and input variable. Parser 
compares that both queries ( means 
query at the application and the  
 
query at the Parser) are functionally 
equivalent or not. Incase both the 
queries are functionally equivalent then 
it reaches the database then response is 
taken from the database, which is  
generated as an HTML Page and is 
send to the user [1]. 
 
VII. Result 
 
This paper presents the first overview of 
SQL injection attacks in web application. 
According to the presented paper an 
effective technique has been developed 
for preventing SQL injection attacks. 
The implementation on web application 
and parser on java CC [7] proved 
effective under testing. Here have been 
diligent efforts in applying parser on web 
application and produces output. 
The result of evaluation and test proves 
that the proposed method is an effective 
technique to prevent SQL Injection 
Attacks. 
 
In this work it has been managed to 
prevent SQL injection attacks through: 
 
• Tautologies Queries 
• Union Queries 
• Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries 
• Piggybacked Queries 
•SQLIPreventParser has been built for 
SQL constraints 
 
Following are the two goals for future 
works: 
1. The parser is to be more 
generalized for maximum number 
of SQL commands. 
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2. The technique can be applied to 
prevent cross-site scripting. 
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